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every person has the right to be conceived in the context of spousal love through 
loving marital intercourse.
The Present Symposium
In this symposium, five Catholic scholars noted for their work in bioethics 
have been invited to comment on the content, strengths, and weaknesses of the 
new Vatican Instruction. Christopher Kaczor considers the introduction and first 
part (nn. 1-10), Rev. Peter Ryan, S.J., the second part (nn. 11-17 and 20-23), and 
William E. May the third part (nn. 24-37). John Finnis and Luke Gormally were 
invited to debate the interpretation of the Instruction’s teaching on embryo adoption 
(n. 19).— E. Christian Brugger
Anthropological, Theological and Ethical Aspects of 
Human Life and Procreation (nn. 1-10)
by Christopher Kaczor 
Most Significant Contributions
The first two sentences of the document offer substantive conclusions about 
controversial questions in bioethics which—while not breaking new ground in terms 
of ecclesial doctrine—strongly reaffirm Catholic teaching. “The dignity of a person 
must be recognized in every human being from conception to natural death. This 
fundamental principle expresses a great ‘yes’ to human life and must be at the center 
of ethical reflection on biomedical research, which has an ever greater importance 
in today’s world” (n. 1). That every human being should be recognized as a person 
remains a controversial claim. Although many people working in bioethics—from 
Peter Singer and Jeff McMahan to Mary Ann Warren and David Boonin—deny that 
all human beings should be treated as persons, there is no agreement among them 
nor a general consensus in the field about what characteristics grant moral status.
First, the Instruction provides a ground for attributing equal basic moral status 
to all human beings, namely, shared human nature which is always a personal nature. 
Second, Dignitas personae holds that human dignity is a fundamental principle that 
should be at the center of disputes in bioethics. This too is controversial. Famously, 
Ruth Macklin argues that dignity is a useless concept in bioethics and that autonomy 
can do all the work necessary.7 In an article titled “The Stupidity of Dignity,” Steven 
Pinker argues that those who appeal to dignity seek “to impose a radical political 
agenda, fed by fervent religious impulses, onto American biomedicine.” 8 The occasion 
for Pinker’s critique was a volume from the President’s Council on Bioethics titled 
Human Dignity and Bioethics, which explored the origins, basis, scope, theories,
7 Ruth Macklin, “Dignity Is a Useless Concept,” British Medical Journal 327.7429 
(December 20, 2003): 1419-1420.
8 Steven Pinker, “The Stupidity ofDignity: Conservative Bioethics’ Latest, Most Dangerous 
Ploy,” New Republic, May 28, 2008, www.tnr.com/story.html?id=d8731cf4-e87b-4d88-b7e7 
-f5059cd0bfbd&p=1.
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and possible importance of the notion of dignity for bioethics.9 Since the issue of the 
dignity of each human being is the subject of much contemporary discussion, Dignitas 
personae provides a service by reaffirming the Church’s teaching on these matters.
Dignitas personae also makes an important contribution, though this too 
is not utterly unique to the document, in exploring the relationship of science, 
philosophy, and ethics. The Instruction notes that scientists and philosophers are not 
of one mind about various disputed questions in bioethics (see n. 2). For example, 
some scientists and philosophers do not favor lethal human embryonic stem cell 
research, while others do.10 It is therefore erroneous to portray “science” or “reason” 
philosophically expressed as uniformly in favor of human embryonic research and in 
opposition to the essentially “religious” or “ideological” viewpoint that every human 
being—including human beings in their embryonic state—should be protected by 
law and welcomed in life.
The document also encourages both scientific research and efforts to advance 
medicine in helping those afflicted by disease and suffering (see n. 3). The Instruction 
emphasizes that the Church is not opposed to empirical research but rather views 
science as valuable in itself (as is all knowledge) and instrumentally useful for serving 
the well-being of humanity.
At the same time, the Instruction points out the limitations of science and 
medicine, even instrumentally in terms of relieving suffering. Physical pain is not the 
only kind of affliction human beings can endure. Medicine can reduce or eliminate 
physiological discomfort, but the spiritual anguish and existential despair often 
endured by modern man requires the light and hope only offered by Christ. The 
ultimate answer to the problem of evil faced in some way by every human being is 
found only in the Resurrection of Jesus through which, ultimately, all other human 
beings can hope for an ultimate and definitive defeat of all that threatens them. 
Science cannot provide this hope.
Nor can science determine what is ethically permissible. The actions of scientists, 
like the actions of all people, should be guided by respect for human dignity (see 
n. 10). While biomedical research that violates human dignity may lead to valuable 
theoretical knowledge, it is nevertheless not morally acceptable. Indeed, almost all 
advocates for scientific investigation acknowledge the impermissibility of at least 
some cases of medical research, such as the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment or the 
research on identical twins conducted by Dr. Joseph Mengele. These advocates 
often fail to recognize that human embryonic stem cell research operates on the 
same assumption as the Tuskegee and Mengele experiments, namely, that some 
human beings lack basic, equal moral worth and may be used simply as means to
9 Edmund D. Pellegrino, Adam Schulman, and Thomas W. Merrill, eds, Human Dignity 
and Bioethics: Essays Commissioned by the President’s Council on Bioethics (Washington 
D.C.: U.S. Independent Agencies and Commissions, 2008). See the book review in this issue 
of the NCBQ.
10 If there were a way to do research on embryos that was not lethal and that in no way 
harmed them, I do not think it would be intrinsically evil.
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(possibly) benefit others. Theoretical knowledge is always worthwhile for itself, but 
it does not follow that any and all means whatsoever for attaining such knowledge 
are ethically permissible.
Dignitas personae recognizes that the Church, like scientific research, also 
faces limits. The Church does not have competence to address many questions. 
Scientific questions about the operations of nature, and medical inquiries about the 
efficacy of treatments, simply fall outside of the scope of the rightful competence 
of the Church in teaching faith and morals (see n. 10).
Most Important Clarifications
Dignitas personae is an official reaffirmation of Donum vitae, despite the 
dissent of many theologians who argue against the Church’s teaching, particularly 
in terms of the impermissibility of in vitro fertilization. In the words of the recent 
Instruction, “The teaching of Donum vitae remains completely valid, both with regard 
to the principles on which it is based and the moral evaluations which it expresses” 
(n. 1). Unsurprisingly, Dignitas personae rejects proportionalist methodology and 
accords with prior interventions of the magisterium, such as Veritatis splendor and 
Evangelium vitae.
Arguably, Dignitas personae goes further than any magisterial document thus 
far not only in affirming that every human embryo should be treated as a person, but 
in virtually asserting that every human embryo is a person. The document asserts 
that the nature of a being, “the ontological dimension,” and the value of a being 
are intrinsically connected. What things are determines the value that should be 
recognized in them and how we should treat them. The document then asserts that 
the human being has the same nature and therefore the same moral value throughout 
the various stages of human development. “Indeed, the reality of the human being for 
the entire span of life, both before and after birth, does not allow us to posit either a 
change in nature or a gradation in moral value, since it possesses full anthropological 
and ethical status. The human embryo has, therefore, from the very beginning, the 
dignity proper to a person” (n. 5).
Dignitas personae posits that the human embryo and the mature human being 
share the same nature. If the nature of a human being is to be a person, the conclusion 
necessarily follows that the human embryo is a person. As Edward J. Furton points 
out, “Still, Dignitas personae has not stated point-blank that ‘the embryo is a person.’ 
We will not find that exact expression anywhere in the text. Nonetheless, it is apparent 
that this is the only possible conclusion that one can draw, for if it is true that the 
embryo undergoes no change in nature throughout its development, and if it is true 
that the embryo, by its very nature, has the dignity of a person, then it must also be 
true that the embryo is a person from the moment of conception.” 11
Greatest Weaknesses
The introduction and first section of Dignitas personae could be made more 
persuasive through greater philosophical rigor in its argumentation. Dignitas
11 Furton, “Is the Time of Personhood Settled?” 4.
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personae provides a theological rationale for human dignity, appealing to the imago 
Dei of Genesis, to the incarnation of Christ which ennobles each human person, 
and to the possibility that all human persons have of becoming “sharers in divine 
nature” (n. 7). A philosophical rationale for basic shared human dignity is suggested, 
but remains not fully developed. “The introduction of discrimination with regard 
to human dignity based on biological, psychological, or educational development, 
or based on health-related criteria, must be excluded” (n. 8). Strong philosophical 
argumentation for this conclusion would have made the document more persuasive 
to more readers.12
Similarly, the Instruction notes, “The body of a human being, from the very 
first stages of its existence, can never be reduced merely to a group of cells. The 
embryonic human body develops progressively according to a well-defined program 
with its proper finality, as is apparent in the birth of every baby” (n. 4). However, 
one of the key issues in the stem cell debate is whether the human embryo has an 
organized human body or whether it is a mere collection, or heap, of cells. Rather 
than simply assume that the human embryo has a human body, Dignitas personae 
would have been strengthened by providing arguments in favor of the proposi­
tion that the human embryo has a human body or by critiquing arguments to the 
contrary. The theological underpinnings in revelation of Catholic teaching are suit­
ably highlighted by Dignitas personae, but greater development and clarity in terms 
of the rational, natural law basis for these teachings would have strengthened the 
document, particularly since “the present Instruction is addressed to the Catholic 
faithful and to all who seek the truth” (n. 3).
New Problems concerning Procreation 
(nn. 11-17 and 20-23)
by Rev. Peter F. Ryan, S.J.
After briefly introducing the second part (see n. 11), the Instruction teaches that 
a technique for assisting fertility will be acceptable only if it respects the relevant 
goods of life, marital unity, and human sexuality (see n. 12). With Donum vitae it 
concludes not only that “all techniques of heterologous artificial fertilization”—that 
is, efforts to conceive artificially by using gametes “from at least one donor other 
than the spouses”—are illicit, but that “those techniques of homologous artificial 
fertilization which substitute for the conjugal act” must also be rejected (n. 12).
The Instruction teaches, however, that “techniques aimed at removing obstacles 
to natural fertilization, as for example, hormonal treatments for infertility, surgery 
for endometriosis, unblocking of fallopian tubes or their surgical repair, are licit” 
(n. 13). Such procedures are treatments properly speaking; they do not substitute 
for the marital act; rather, once they solve the problem of fertility, husband and wife 
conceive through that act.
12 For an example of how this can be done, see Robert P. George and Christopher 
Tollefsen, Embryo: A Defense o f Human Life (New York: Doubleday, 2008).
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